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Comment
A Fire Without Smoke:
The Elimination of the Direct Evidence
Requirement for Mixed-Motive Employment
Discrimination Cases in Costa v. Desert Palace,
Inc.
Kelly Pierce*
Catharina Costa did an excellent job working in a
warehouse owned by Caesars Palace Hotel and Casino.'
Nonetheless, she was subjected to a series of informal rebukes
by supervisors, denied benefits that were afforded to her male
colleagues, and received harsher discipline than did similarly
offending men.2 She was eventually terminated by the casino
following an altercation with a male colleague who verbally and
physically assaulted her.3 Costa, the only woman working in
the warehouse, alleged that the casino's decision to fire her was
motivated by her sex, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. 4 The casino responded that Costa was terminated
for her disciplinary history and the physical altercation. 5 At
trial, the jury found that Costa's termination did violate Title
VII, and awarded her over $350,000 in back pay and damages. 6
On appeal, a three-member panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that Costa's evidence was not
* J.D. Candidate 2004, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 1999,
Carleton College. I would like to thank Professor Miranda McGowan, Rachel
Clark Hughey, and Rebecca Bernhard for their guidance; the members of the
Minnesota Law Review for their good humor and support; Kay, Jim, and
Marissa Miller for their love and endless encouragement; and my husband,
Benjamin Pierce, for bringing joy and laughter to my life.
1. Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 844 (9th Cir. 2002) (en
banc), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 816 (2003).
2. Id. at 844-46.
3. Id. at 846.
4. Id. at 844-46.
5. Id. at 846.
6. Id. at 846-47.
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sufficiently "direct" to merit a "mixed-motive" jury instruction. 7
The panel held that such direct evidence was required under
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins8 for a plaintiff to proceed under a
mixed-motive theory. 9 Sitting en banc, the Ninth Circuit
reversed the panel's opinion, holding that a mixed-motive
plaintiff need not prove a Title VII violation through the use of
direct evidence, but could succeed through the use of either
direct or circumstantial evidence.10
In holding that direct evidence is not required for a
plaintiff to proceed under a mixed-motive theory, the Ninth
Circuit jumped into a fiery debate over the evidentiary
standards required of a Title VII plaintiff who alleges that a
challenged employment action was motivated both by
discrimination and by other legitimate reasons. Although most
federal circuits hold plaintiffs to a direct evidence standard, the
circuits have been widely split on how they define the term.ll
By holding that direct evidence is not even required to trigger a
mixed-motive case, Costa represents a major departure from
settled law and puts the Ninth Circuit in direct conflict with
the other federal circuits. 12  To address this conflict, the
Supreme Court has granted the casino's petition for certiorari
7. Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 268 F.3d 882, 889 (9th Cir. 2001), rev'd en
banc, 299 F. 3d 838 (9th Cir. 2002). Cases governed by the "mixed-motive"
theory of intentional employment discrimination arise when a plaintiff alleges
that a challenged employment action was the result of both legitimate reasons
and illegitimate discrimination. See infra notes 41-71 and accompanying text
(discussing the development of the mixed-motive theory of discrimination and
its codification in the 1991 amendments to Title VII).
8. 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989).
9. Costa, 268 F.3d at 889-90.
10. Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 844 (9th Cir. 2002) (en
banc), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 816 (2003).
11. See infra notes 85-111 and accompanying text (discussing these
different definitions of direct evidence). The federal courts are generally split
into three groups: those that apply a "classic" definition of direct evidence,
those that apply an "animus plus" definition, and those that simply require
plaintiffs to submit evidence, either direct or circumstantial, of discrimination.
See Costa, 299 F.3d at 852-53; Steven M. Tindall, Note, Do As She Does, Not
As She Says: The Shortcomings of Justice O'Connor's Direct Evidence
Requirement in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
332, 354-64 (1996); Michael A. Zubrensky, Note, Despite the Smoke, There Is
No Gun: Direct Evidence Requirements in Mixed-Motives Employment Law
After Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 46 STAN. L. REV. 959, 970 (1994).
12. See infra notes 85-111, 135-46 and accompanying text (discussing the
imposition of the direct evidence requirement by other federal circuits, and
Costa's elimination of the requirement).
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and will hear the case during the 2002 term.1 3
Part I of this Comment examines the origins of Title VII,
the development of the pretext and mixed-motive theories of
disparate treatment, the 1991 amendments to Title VII, and
the three definitions of direct evidence applied by the federal
circuits. Part II describes the three-member panel's reversal of
the jury award for Costa and the en banc reversal of that
decision in Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc. 14 Part III discusses how
the Ninth Circuit reached its decision and argues that the
elimination of the direct evidence requirement is more
consistent with both Title VII and Price Waterhouse. Part IV
articulates that Costa's refusal to require direct evidence will
have an impact on the distinction between pretext and mixed-
motive cases, on future interpretations and use of McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green,15 and on the use of legal presumptions
in employment discrimination cases. This Comment concludes
that despite Costa's weaknesses, the Supreme Court should
affirm the Ninth Circuit and decline to require direct evidence
from mixed-motive plaintiffs.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRETEXT AND MIXED-
MOTIVE THEORIES OF INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION
Congress intended the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to prohibit
discrimination in education, transportation, public
accommodations and facilities, participation in federally
assisted programs, and employment.1 6 Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of
any of five specifically enumerated characteristics: "race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin." 17 After the passage of Title
VII, it was clear that an employer could not fire, or refuse to
hire or promote an applicant, on the basis of her membership in
a protected group.' 8 What was less clear was how a plaintiff
13. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 123 S. Ct. 816 (2003). The case is
scheduled for argument on April 21, 2003. The Court's grant of the petition
suggests its interest in procedural matters in the employment discrimination
context, as it also recently addressed pleading standards in these cases in
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510-12 (2002).
14. 299 F.3d at 847-54.
15. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). McDonnell Douglas is one of the most significant
employment discrimination decisions. See infra notes 21-29 and
accompanying text.
16. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000).
17. The Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) to -2(d).
18. JOEL WM. FRIEDMAN & GEORGE M. STRICKLER, JR., THE LAW OF
2003] 2175
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could establish that her employer had illegally discriminated
against her. In response, scholars and courts developed two
theories of employment discrimination law: disparate
treatment and disparate impact. 19  Within the class of
disparate treatment cases, what a plaintiff must do to prove a
prima facie case of discrimination has been particularly
unclear, especially because employers tend not to indicate that
their employment decisions were discriminatory or the product
of bias.20
A. PRETEXTUAL INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION
The Supreme Court initially read Title VII as requiring
plaintiffs to prove that prejudice or discrimination based on the
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 57 (5th ed. 2001).
19. See, e.g., Ann C. McGinley, !Viva La Evoluci6n!: Recognizing
Unconscious Motive in Title VII, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POLY 415, 446-47
(2000) (discussing the evolution of the two theories of discrimination law). For
a plaintiff to prevail on a disparate treatment theory, she must prove that her
employer had some sort of discriminatory "intent" in making a challenged
employment decision. Id. Justice Stewart described disparate treatment as
"the most easily understood type of discrimination. The employer simply
treats some people less favorably than others because of their race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin." Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). In contrast, plaintiffs asserting a disparate impact
theory do not have to make a showing of discriminatory intent. See McGinley,
supra, at 447; see also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971)
(holding that an employer's good intent or absence of discriminatory intent
does not "redeem" employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate
to disproportionately impact one group of people). The disparate impact
theory of employment discrimination law is irrelevant for purposes of this
Comment.
20. At the inception of Title VII, employment discrimination tended to be
more overt, formal, and structural. See Robert Brookins, Mixed-Motives, Title
VII, and Removing Sexism from Employment: The Reality and the Rhetoric, 59
ALB. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1995); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our
Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal
Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1164 (1995). For example,
Robert Brookins notes that "[b]efore the mid-1960s, some job advertisements
openly specified 'males preferred."' Brookins, supra, at 11 n.30 (citing
DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE
LAW 168 (1989)). That discrimination was at one time so overt suggests that
direct evidence was easier for plaintiffs who were the victim of discrimination
to produce. In the modern context,' however, "cases of blatant, deliberate
discrimination [in which direct evidence is available] no doubt exist, but are
likely to represent only a small fraction of all employment decisions in which
intergroup bias has played a role." Krieger, supra, at 1223; see also infra note
237 and accompanying text (arguing that McDonnell Douglas should apply
where discrimination is more overt-as the sole motivating factor behind a
challenged employment action-or when discrimination is altogether absent).
2176
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plaintiffs membership in a protected class alone motivated an
employer's allegedly discriminatory action. 21 This was known
as the "pretext" theory of analysis, which proceeds under the
three-step, burden-shifting approach first established in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,22 and further articulated in
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine.23
In McDonnell Douglas, the Court held that a plaintiff in a
Title VII suit "must carry the initial burden.., of establishing
a prima facie case" of discrimination.24 According to the Court,
a plaintiffs prima facie case has four distinct elements. 25 First,
the plaintiff must prove that she is a member of a group
protected by Title VII.26 Second, the plaintiff must prove that
she "applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer
was seeking applicants."27 Next the plaintiff must prove that
she was rejected for the position. 28 Finally, she must prove
that the position remained open after she was rejected and the
employer continued to solicit and receive applications from
similarly situated candidates. 29 A plaintiffs satisfaction of her
prima facie case is the first step of the Court's articulated
three-step approach for proving intentional discrimination. 30
The Court has suggested that the function of the prima facie
case is to eliminate as factors "the most common
21. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-07
(1973).
22. Id.
23. 450 U.S. 248, 252-56 (1981).
24. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
25. Id.
26. See id. Title VII only prohibits discrimination on the basis of five
characteristics: "race, color, religion, national origin, and sex." 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(a) (2000).
27. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
28. Id.
29. Id. In articulating these four elements, the Court was careful to point
out that they relate specifically to a situation where a plaintiff alleges that she
was not selected for a position on the basis of her membership in a racial
minority. Id. These elements are articulated differently in cases involving
other sorts of challenged employment actions, such as a termination, a failure
to promote, or unequal distribution of benefits. Id. For example, the four
elements of a prima facie case alleging discriminatory termination would be:
the plaintiff is a member of a protected class; the plaintiff was performing up
to the standards set for the position; the plaintiff was terminated from the
position; and similarly situated employees were not terminated. See St.
Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993).
30. Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-54 (1981).
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nondiscriminatory reasons" for an employment action, 31 and
that its establishment thus creates a presumption that the
employer's action was the result of illegal discrimination. 32
Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case of
discrimination, the burden shifts to the defendant to rebut the
resulting presumption of discrimination by asserting
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the employment
action.33 A defendant cannot rest on its pleadings; it must
introduce a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason into evidence
in order to satisfy its burden.34 All the evidence need do is
raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
defendant actually discriminated against the plaintiff.35 Once
the defendant has satisfied this burden, the plaintiffs prima
facie case is rebutted. 36
The third and final step of the McDonnell
Douglas/Burdine approach allows the plaintiff the opportunity
to demonstrate that the reason offered by the defendant for the
employment action is pretext for illegal discrimination. 37 Thus,
the ultimate burden of persuading the fact-finder that
employer discriminated against the plaintiff remains with the
plaintiff.38 The plaintiff may prove discrimination either by
showing that a discriminatory reason was more likely to have
motivated the employment decision, or that the reason offered
by the defendant is false. 39
31. Id. at 253-54. The Court articulated the function of shifting burdens
of proof in a Title VII case as "intended progressively to sharpen the inquiry
into the elusive factual question of intentional discrimination." Id. at 255 n.8.
32. Id. at 254.
33. Id. at 254-56. Because the prima facie case establishes a presumption
in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant cannot remain silent. As the Court
explained, "[i]f the trier of fact believes the plaintiffs evidence, and if the
employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter
judgment for the plaintiff because no issue of fact remains in the case." Id. at
254.
34. Id. at 255 n.9.
35. Id. at 255.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 256.
38. See id.
39. Id.; see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-05
(1973) (noting that evidence relevant to the showing of pretext included the
plaintiff's treatment by McDonnell Douglas during his employment,
McDonnell Douglas's policies as related to minority employment, and the
company's reaction to the plaintiffs civil rights work). In St. Mary's Honor
Center v. Hicks, the Court increased the plaintiffs burden of persuasion by
holding that mere proof of pretext does not require the court to find in favor of
2178 [Vol 87:2173
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Although the three-step framework articulated in
McDonnell Douglas and Burdine clearly established the
procedure for proving intentional discrimination, the Court did
not specify what type of evidence was required to fulfill any of
the steps.40
B. MIXED-MOTIVE INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION
Prior to Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins and the development
of a mixed-motive theory of intentional discrimination, Title
VII claims proceeded under a theory of either disparate
treatment or disparate impact, both of which presuppose that a
single reason alone motivated the challenged employment
decision.41 In Price Waterhouse, the Court addressed the issue
of whether an employer could be liable under Title VII for
employment actions that were the result of both legitimate
reasons and illegitimate discrimination. 42
The facts of Price Waterhouse are common to instances of
discrimination on the basis of sex stereotypes. 43 Plaintiff Ann
Hopkins was a female senior manager at Price Waterhouse,
who was "neither offered nor denied admission to the [firm's]
partnership."44 Rather, Hopkins was informed that she would
not be reconsidered for partnership after two partners who had
previously supported her withdrew their support. 45 The
company had legitimate concerns about Hopkins's
"interpersonal skills,"46 but also considered illegitimate sex
the plaintiff. 509 U.S. 502, 508-12 (1993). Hicks requires not only that a
plaintiff prove pretext, but also that discrimination was the real reason for the
challenged employment action. Id. at 508. Some have termed this the
'pretext-plus" approach to proving a disparate treatment claim. See
McGinley, supra note 19, at 455.
40. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-56; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 800-
06.
41. Krieger, supra note 20, at 1179; Joseph J. Ward, Note, A Call for Price
Waterhouse II: The Legacy of Justice O'Connor's Direct Evidence Requirement
for Mixed-Motive Employment Discrimination Claims, 61 ALB. L. REV. 627,
635 (1997).
42. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241-247 (1989) (plurality
opinion). Such a combination of legitimate and illegitimate reasons would
include firing an employee both because she performed poorly on her last
performance review and because she is a woman.
43. For lengthy discussions of the facts of Price Waterhouse, see Tindall,
supra note 11, at 339-41; Zubrensky, supra note 11, at 965-66.
44. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 231.
45. Id. at 233 n.1.
46. Id. at 234-35. For example, Hopkins's colleagues indicated that she
was "sometimes overly aggressive, unduly harsh, difficult to work with and
2003] 2179
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stereotypes. 47 For example, one evaluator suggested that in
order to improve her partnership chances, Hopkins should
"walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more
femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear
jewelry."48
The Court held that Hopkins's evidence proved that the
decision not to reconsider her for partnership was motivated, at
least in part, by sex stereotypes. 49 In so doing, the plurality
articulated that a plaintiffs burden of initial proof is satisfied if
she can prove that discriminatory animus or bias played a
"motivating part" in the employment decision.50 If the plaintiff
makes this showing, the defendant can avoid liability only by
proving by a preponderance of the evidence 51 that "its
legitimate reason, standing alone, would have induced it to
make the same decision." 52 This has come to be known as the
"same decision" affirmative defense.53  If the defendant is
unable to make a "same decision" defense, it cannot avoid
equitable damages. 54 Although Price Waterhouse did advance
some legitimate reasons for its failure to reconsider Hopkins's
partnership, the Court remanded for a determination of
whether Price Waterhouse had proved that it "would have
made the same decision even if it had not taken the plaintiffs
gender into account."55
In a concurring opinion Justice O'Connor seemed to
recognize, as one scholar has explained, that "because
discrimination does not always fit neatly into the traditional
impatient with staff." Id. at 235. Of these interpersonal problems, her
brusqueness with staff members seemed the most damaging to her
partnership prospects. Id. at 234.
47. Id. at 234-36.
48. Id. at 235.
49. Id. at 255.
50. Id. at 258. Although they concurred in the judgment, neither Justice
White nor Justice O'Connor believed the plaintiffs burden should be this easy.
Instead, each argued that a plaintiff must show that the illegitimate motive
was a "substantial" factor behind the challenged action. See id. at 259 (White,
J., concurring); id. at 274 (O'Connor, J., concurring). For more discussion of
this point, see Charles A. Sullivan, Accounting for Price Waterhouse: Proving
Disparate Treatment Under Title VII, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 1107, 1125-32 (1991).
51. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258.
52. Id. at 246 n.l1.
53. See, e.g., HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR., CIVIL RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW 239 (1997).
54. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258.
55. Id.
[Vol 87:21732180
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disparate treatment or disparate impact frameworks, a
plaintiff should be permitted to bring a claim of discrimination
under a mixed-motive framework."56  O'Connor argued,
however, that a plaintiff must prove that an illegitimate reason
played a "substantial factor"57 in the employer's decision
through "direct evidence"58 of the employer's reliance on the
illegitimate reason.59  Justice O'Connor favored a direct
evidence requirement because of the "significant differences"
between shifting the burden of persuasion to the defendant in
cases resting only on statistical evidence and shifting the
burden in cases where an employee proved through direct
evidence that an illegitimate reason partially motivated an
employment decision. 60
Justice O'Connor's opinion was arguably the "narrowest
ground" for the decision,6' and was thus taken by many lower
courts to be the controlling opinion in the case. 62 As a result,
56. Ward, supra note 41, at 643.
57. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 265 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
58. Nowhere in her concurrence did Justice O'Connor define "direct
evidence." Instead, she seemed to define the term by negative inference to
"stray remarks," stating,
Thus, stray remarks in the workplace, while perhaps probative of
sexual harassment, cannot justify requiring the employer to prove
that its hiring or promotion decisions were based on legitimate
criteria. Nor can statements by nondecisionmakers, or statements by
decisionmakers unrelated to the decisional process itself, suffice to
satisfy the plaintiffs burden in this regard.
Id. at 277 (citation omitted). From this statement alone, it seems that while
mere "stray remarks" are not sufficient to constitute direct evidence, a
statement by a decision maker related to the decisional process may be
sufficient.
59. Id. at 276. O'Connor wrote that "in order to justify shifting the
burden on the issue of causation to the defendant, a disparate treatment
plaintiff must show by direct evidence that an illegitimate criterion was a
substantial factor in the decision." Id.
60. Id. at 275.
61. As the First Circuit noted in Fernandes v. Costa Bros. Masonry, Inc.,
"when the Supreme Court rules by means of a plurality opinion (as was true in
Price Waterhouse), inferior courts should give effect to the narrowest ground
upon which a majority of the Justices supporting the judgment would agree."
199 F.3d 572, 580 (1st Cir. 1999) (citing Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188,
193 (1977)).
62. See, e.g., id. (holding O'Connor's concurrence to be the dominant
opinion in Price Waterhouse). But see Thomas v. Nat'l Football League Players
Ass'n, 131 F.3d 198, 203 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (noting that "Justice O'Connor's
concurrence was one of six votes supporting the Court's judgment .... so that
it is far from clear that Justice O'Connor's opinion, in which no other Justice
joined, should be taken as establishing binding precedent").
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many of the federal circuits began to hold plaintiffs to a direct
evidence requirement prior to.shifting the burden of proof to
the defendant, 63 despite the fact that O'Connor's opinion failed
to provide a clear definition of direct evidence. 64
C. THE 1991 AMENDMENTS TO THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 (the Act) has been viewed as a
congressional response to several 1989 Supreme Court cases
that many saw as being hostile to employment discrimination
plaintiffs. 65 The amended Civil Rights Act changed Title VII in
two major ways with regard to Price Waterhouse and the direct
evidence problem. First, Congress codified the plurality's
motivating factor test by amending section 703 of the 1964 Act
by adding a new subsection (m), which allows a plaintiff to
prove a defendant committed an unlawful employment practice
when the plaintiff "demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment
practice, even though other factors also motivated the
practice." 66
Second, the Act changed the remedies available to a
plaintiff when a defendant is able to prove that it would have
made the same employment decision in the absence of its
illegitimate consideration of a plaintiffs membership in a
63. See, e.g., Zubrensky, supra note 11, at 969.
64. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at. 277 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
65. Benjamin C. Mizer, Note, Toward a Motivating Factor Test for
Individual Disparate Treatment Claims, 100 MICH. L. REV. 234, 238 (2001).
In addition to Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 275, the decisions that many
thought prompted the 1991 amendments include Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989), which held that section 1981 does not protect
against discrimination in the performance of contracts; Lorance v. AT&T
Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989), which held that a Title VII claim is
triggered at the time the employer engages in the alleged discriminatory act,
not when the employee felt its effect; Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989),
which held res judicata did not bar the claims of white employees attempting
to challenge employment decisions made pursuant to a consent decree when
they failed to intervene in prior employment discrimination proceedings
between the employer and minority employees; and Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), which held that the burden of persuasion in a
disparate treatment claim remains with the plaintiff.
66. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000). From a practical standpoint, this
means that liability attaches to a defendant employer as soon as an employee
is able to prove that consideration of her membership in a protected class was
a motivating factor behind the challenged employment action. Id. § 2000e-
2(a), -2(m).
2182 [Vol 87:2173
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protected class. 67 If the defendant is able to make this showing,
the court "shall not award damages or issue an order requiring
any admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or
payment."68 The plaintiff is still entitled to attorney's fees,
declaratory relief, and injunctive relief, but is precluded from
remedies such as back pay and reinstatement if the defendant
is able to make a same-decision showing.69 The remedies
section makes it clear that defendants are not allowed to
"escape entirely from liability by explaining that they would
have made the same decision absent the impermissible
consideration."70  Thus, while the Act codified Price
Waterhouse's motivating factor test, it also overruled the
decision to some extent by modifying the available remedies. 71
While the amendments clarified the way in which a mixed-
motive case was to proceed, they did little to distinguish what
separated a mixed-motive case from a pretext case in terms of
procedure. 72 The Act was initially proposed as a response "to
the Supreme Court's recent decisions by restoring the civil
rights protections that were dramatically limited by those
decisions."73 This purpose is echoed elsewhere in the legislative
history and the 1991 amendments themselves, 74 suggesting
that the impetus behind the Act was congressional
disagreement with the Court's employment discrimination
67. Michael J. Zimmer, The Emerging Uniform Structure of Disparate
Treatment Discrimination Litigation, 30 GA. L. REV. 563, 585 (1996). Under
Price Waterhouse, a defendant may escape from liability entirely if it
successfully makes the "same decision" defense. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at
246 n.11.
68. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(ii).
69. See id.; HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE WORKPLACE 343
(3d ed. 2001); Ward, supra note 41, at 646.
70. Mizer, supra note 65, at 250.
71. See Ward, supra note 41, at 646. Ward suggests that the 1991 Act
benefits plaintiffs because the "use of direct evidence will now almost certainly
result in employer liability where an illegitimate factor is proven by a plaintiff.
In addition, nothing in the statute suggests that a plaintiff may not use
circumstantial evidence to show that the defendant was motivated by
discriminatory reasons." Id.
72. See, e.g., Zimmer, supra note 67, at 585-86.
73. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 101-856, at 1 (1990); see supra note 65 and
accompanying text.
74. Section 3 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 states that one of the Act's
purposes was to "respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by
expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide
adequate protection to victims of discrimination." Civil Rights Act of 1991,
Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071.
2003] 2183
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decisions. The legislative history surrounding mixed-motive
cases, however, does not reveal congressional approval (or
disapproval) of Justice O'Connor's direct evidence
requirement. 75 The only mention of direct evidence in the
debate surrounding the amendments appears in the comments
of a Georgetown University law professor during Senate
hearings.76 Yet it is difficult to infer that Congress intended to
hold plaintiffs to a direct evidence standard solely from the
comments of a non-legislator.77 Thus, as one commentator has
noted, "combing the legislative history to discern Congress's
intent regarding direct evidence becomes largely a task of
inference from silence."78
Yet some evidence in the legislative history relates to the
concept of "stray remarks," the language Justice O'Connor used
to define direct evidence in the negative.79 In a section of the
Conference Report dealing with the committee's decision to
partially overturn Price Waterhouse, the conferees stated,
In providing liability for discrimination that is a "'contributing
factor,"' the Committee intends to restore the rule applied by the
majority of the circuits prior to the Price Waterhouse decision that any
discrimination that is actually shown to play a role in a contested
employment decision may be the subject of liability. Conduct or
statements are relevant under this test only if the plaintiff shows a
nexus between the conduct or statements and the employment
decision at issue. For example, isolated or stray remarks ... are not
alone sufficient.80
75. Robert Belton, Mixed-Motive Cases in Employment Discrimination
Law Revisited: A Brief Updated View of the Swamp, 51 MERCER L. REV. 651,
661 (2000); Kenneth R. Davis, The Stumbling Three-Step, Burden-Shifting
Approach in Employment Discrimination Cases, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 703, 750-
51 (1995); Mizer, supra note 65, at 256. Robert Belton notes that Congress did
not address whether "a plaintiff must introduce direct evidence to shift the
burden of persuasion on the same-decision defense to the employer." Belton,
supra, at 661.
76. See Civil Rights Act of 1990: Hearings on S. 2104 Before the Senate
Comm. on Labor and Human Res., 101st Cong. 171 (1990) (statement of Prof.
Eleanor Holmes Norton) (arguing that mere thoughts were not sufficient to
prove that discrimination was the motivating factor behind an employment
action, and that "Itihere has to be direct evidence of a motivating factor");
Mizer, supra note 65, at 258.
77. Mizer, supra note 65, at 258.
78. Id. at 257.
79. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 277 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); see supra note 58 and accompanying text (discussing Justice
O'Connor's use of the term "stray remarks").
80. H.R. REP. 102-40(11), at 18 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694,
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Many commentators have suggested that "[t]his 'stray
remarks' language seems to mirror Justice O'Connor's negative
definition of direct evidence, indicating that Congress may have
intended to codify such a requirement in the motivating factor
provision."8' Others have suggested that this language, along
with other language like it, does not demonstrate that Congress
"embrace[d]" Justice O'Connor's direct evidence requirement
for mixed-motive discrimination cases.82 Because there was
neither clear endorsement nor rejection, and because
Congress's attention in amending Title VII was primarily
focused elsewhere,8 3 commentators have suggested that the
text of Title VII alone should guide judicial resolution of the
direct evidence problem.84
D. DIFFERING INTERPRETATIONS OF DIRECT EVIDENCE
While the Act initially may seem straightforward, the
federal circuits have long been split on the issue of proof in
mixed-motive discrimination cases.85 Most courts determine
whether a plaintiff proceeds along a mixed-motive path or a
pretext path depending on the type of evidence the plaintiff
presents.8 6 In essence, a plaintiff will proceed along the mixed-
motive path if she presents direct evidence of discrimination.8 7
81. Mizer, supra note 65, at 257.
82. Belton, supra note 75, at 661 (suggesting that the House Report is not
clear as to whether the Committee agreed with O'Connor's direct evidence
requirement, but noting that "it is clear that Congress did not affirmatively
embrace the direct evidence standard").
83. See supra notes 65, 73 and accompanying text (discussing the impetus
behind the 1991 amendments to the Civil Rights Act).
84. Mizer, supra note 65, at 257, 260-62. Benjamin C. Mizer suggests
that it is ironic that "the lower federal courts gleaned a direct evidence
requirement from a single concurring opinion that Congress expressly
rejected, and they subsequently grafted that requirement onto the very
statutory provision that overturned the decision." Id. at 262. He concludes
that as a result, "courts should turn to the text of the statute as their
touchstone in resolving the considerable confusion surrounding individual
employment discrimination claims." Id.; see also infra notes 171-73 and
accompanying text.
85. Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 852-53 (9th Cir. 2002) (en
banc), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 816 (2003); Krieger, supra note 20, at 1221;
Tindall, supra note 11, at 354-64; Zubrensky, supra note 11, at 970.
86. See Krieger, supra note 20, at 1220-21 (discussing the general forms of
direct evidence required by the federal circuits with reference to a cognitive
process approach to discrimination and equal employment opportunity).
87. See, e.g., Costa, 299 F.3d at 848-50; see also Trans World Airlines, Inc.
v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985) (remarking that "the McDonnell Douglas
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A plaintiff unable to proffer direct evidence must proceed under
a pretext theory.88 In defining direct evidence, the federal
courts of appeal are split into three groups: those that apply or
attempt to apply the classic definition of direct evidence
(evidence proving that discrimination motivated a challenged
employment action without need for an inference);8 9 those that
apply an animus plus definition (evidence proving a
particularly strong case of discrimination through an
inference);90 and those that apply an animus definition
(evidence simply proving animus towards a plaintiffs class to
prove discrimination). 91
Courts applying the classic definition of direct evidence
require that plaintiffs actually produce evidence that proves
the defendant's discriminatory animus without requiring an
inference or presumption. 92 The Sixth Circuit applied this
standard in Laderach v. U-Haul of Northwestern Ohio, holding
that the plaintiffs evidence-her direct supervisor told the
test is inapplicable where the plaintiff presents direct evidence of
discrimination").
88. See Costa, 299 F.3d at 848-50.
89. The circuits applying a classic definition are the First, Fifth, Sixth,
and Tenth Circuits. See Ward, supra note 41, at 649; Tindall, supra note 11,
at 356. For examples of the classic definition of direct evidence, see Shorter v.
ICG Holdings, Inc., 188 F.3d 1204, 1207 (10th Cir. 1999), Haas v. ADVO Sys.,
Inc., 168 F.3d 732, 733 (5th Cir. 1999), and Mooney v. Aramco Servs. Co., 54
F.3d 1207, 1217 (5th Cir. 1995).
90. Courts applying the animus plus definition are the Second, Third,
Seventh, Eighth, Eleventh, and D.C. circuits. See Tindall, supra note 11, at
359. Although Steven M. Tindall did not place the D.C. Circuit in this group,
he noted that the Circuit had "not ruled squarely on the issue" at the time of
his writing. Id. at 362 n.188. But see Thomas v. Nat'l Football League Players
Ass'n, 131 F.3d 198, 204 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The court in Costa correctly
suggests that the D.C. Circuit does belong in the animus plus group. Costa,
299 F.3d at 852. Other examples of the animus plus definition include Kriss v.
Sprint Communications Co., 58 F.3d 1276, 1281-82 (8th Cir. 1995), and Hook
v. Ernst & Young, 28 F.3d 366, 373-74 (3d Cir. 1994).
91. Currently, only the Fourth Circuit subscribes to the animus definition.
See White v. Fed. Express Corp., 939 F.2d 157, 160 (4th Cir. 1991) (per
curiam); Tindall, supra note 11, at 362. It may, however, be moving towards
an animus plus approach. Id. at 362 n.191.
92. See, e.g., Ward, supra note 41, at 649; see also GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 2.7 (3d ed. 1996). Evidence that
would satisfy this classic definition is evidence that a decision maker took the
plaintiffs membership in a protected class into account at the time of making
the challenged employment action. For example, evidence similar to that
offered by plaintiff Hopkins in Price Waterhouse would meet this definition.
See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 231-36 (1989) (plurality
opinion).
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shop foreman that he did not promote the plaintiff "because of
her sex"-constituted direct evidence.93 There, the court noted
that "direct evidence is that evidence which, if believed,
requires the conclusion that unlawful discrimination was at
least a motivating factor in the employer's actions."94 Yet other
circuits applying the classic definition have held that a
plaintiffs assertions that he had overheard his supervisor
express a desire to replace the plaintiff with a "younger and
cheaper" worker 95 did not constitute direct evidence sufficient
to invoke a mixed-motive analysis, because the statements
required an inference to conclude that the employer was
motivated by age related animus.96  Some scholars have
asserted that this classic definition of direct evidence is so strict
and difficult to meet that "plaintiffs in these circuits have little
chance of taking advantage of Price Waterhouse burden
shifting."97
Courts applying the animus plus definition require that
the plaintiff "prove a particularly strong case-more than
ordinarily would be required for an inference of discrimination
to be permissible."98 This approach has been suggested to
correlate with Justice O'Connor's definition of direct evidence-
i.e., "evidence of statements by decisionmakers related to the
decisionmaking process that reflect discriminatory animus."99
In Ostrowski v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Cos.,' °° the Second
Circuit stated that while it followed Justice O'Connor's direct
evidence approach generally, it did not hold a plaintiff to the
classic definition.10' The court asserted it did not use the term
"direct" "in its sense as antonym of .'circumstantial,' for that
type of "'direct' evidence as to a mental state is usually
impossible to obtain."102 The court held that a plaintiff is
93. 207 F.3d 825, 829-30 (6th Cir. 2000).
94. Id. at 829 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Jacklyn v.
Schering-Plough Healthcare Prods. Sales Corp., 176 F.3d 921, 926 (6th Cir.
1999)).
95. Mooney v. Aramco Servs. Co., 54 F.3d 1207, 1218 (5th Cir. 1995).
96. Id. at 1218-19.
97. Tindall, supra note 11, at 359.
98. Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 852 (9th Cir. 2002) (en
banc), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 816 (2003).
99. Tindall, supra note 11, at 359 (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
490 U.S. 228, 277 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
100. 968 F.2d 171 (2d Cir. 1992).
101. Id. at 181-82.
102. Id. at 181 (citing Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1185
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entitled to a mixed-motive instruction if she has presented
"evidence of conduct or statements by persons involved in the
decisionmaking process that may be viewed as directly
reflecting the alleged discriminatory attitude."10 3 Using this
understanding of direct evidence, the Ostrowski court held that
the evidence presented by the plaintiff-for example,
supervisor statements that an employee who is over 60 could
not contribute to the workplaceI 04-was sufficiently "direct" to
warrant a Price Waterhouse jury instruction.10 5 Other courts of
appeal, such as the Seventh Circuit, have indicated their
acceptance of an animus plus definition of direct evidence by
referring to statements that require an inference to prove
discriminatory intent as "direct evidence," and by instructing
lower courts on remand to determine whether comments were
"merely stray remarks" unconnected to a challenged
employment decision.10 6
The Fourth Circuit is the only animus definition
adherent, 0 7 allowing a plaintiff to carry her burden "by any
sufficiently probative direct or indirect evidence." 10 8 In White v.
Federal Express Corp., the court stated that a plaintiff need
only prove that "the employer's motive to discriminate was a
substantial factor in the adverse personnel action."10 9
Therefore, the court did not require a plaintiff to prove to the
finder of fact that the evidence offered to establish
discrimination was direct evidence." 0  Thus, as one
commentator has suggested, the Fourth Circuit is the only
circuit that would allow evidence of statistics or stray remarks
to satisfy a plaintiffs burden and justify shifting a burden to
the defendant." '
That the federal circuits have three radically different
definitions of what constitutes direct evidence means that a
(2d Cir. 1992)).
103. Id. at 182.
104. Id. at 174.
105. Id. at 183-84.
106. See, e.g., Robinson v. PPG Indus., Inc., 23 F.3d 1159, 1165 (7th Cir.
1994) (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 277 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., concurring)).
107. See supra note 91.
108. White v. Fed. Express Corp., 939 F.2d 157, 160 (4th Cir. 1991) (per
curiam).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Tindall, supra note 11, at 363.
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plaintiffs evidence might be considered sufficiently "direct" to
merit a mixed-motive instruction in animus or animus plus
jurisdictions, but may not be considered "direct" in jurisdictions
applying the strict classical definition of direct evidence.
II. COSTA: THE MOVE AWAY FROM DIRECT EVIDENCE
On August 2, 2002, the Ninth Circuit held in Costa v.
Desert Palace, Inc. that "Title VII imposes no special or
heightened evidentiary burden on a plaintiff in a so-called
'mixed-motive' case." 12 Costa, the sole woman working in one
of the casino's warehouses, alleged the casino's decision to fire
her was motivated by her sex. 1 3 Throughout the course of her
employment, Costa's work was characterized as excellent, and
as one of her supervisors explained, "We knew when she was
out there the job would get done.""14
Yet despite Costa's strong work history with the casino,
she had a number of problems both with colleagues and
managers. 115 Costa began to feel as if she "was being singled
out because she was a woman," resulting in her being treated
as an "outcast."'" 6 She detailed an extensive series of events
that included "informal rebukes, denial of privileges accorded
her male co-workers, suspension, and finally discharge."' 17 For
example, she was often warned and even suspended for the use
of profanity while similarly offending men were not
disciplined.118 She also alleged that her termination was due in
part to her "failure to conform to sexual stereotypes."" 9 Costa
was known as "the lady Teamster"; was called "a bitch" and "a
fucking cunt"; and was told that "[y]ou got more balls than the
guys."'2 °
These events culminated in a physical altercation with
another Teamster, which the casino alleged was the basis for
112. 299 F.3d 838, 844 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct.
816 (2003). Prior to Costa, many commentators had suggested that the direct
evidence test should be rejected altogether or at least clarified. See, e.g.,
Tindall, supra note 11, at 364-69; Zubrensky, supra note 11, at 980-86.
113. Costa, 299 F.3d at 844.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 844-45.
118. Id. at 845.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 845-46.
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Costa's termination.12' Costa was trapped by a male colleague,
who, upset about a report he believed she made about his
"unauthorized lunch breaks," shoved her against a wall. 122
Although Costa was the one to report the incident and the one
with physical corroboration of the confrontation (her arm was
bruised, while the male colleague showed no injury), the casino
disciplined both employees-suspending the male colleague for
five days and firing Costa. 123 Costa filed a Title VII suit
against the casino alleging sex discrimination. 124
At trial, the casino alleged that Costa was fired because of
her disciplinary history and her confrontation with the male
colleague. 125 Costa did not disclaim her disciplinary history,
but suggested "rather that her sex was a motivating factor in
her termination." 126 The trial court denied the casino's motion
for summary judgment on the disparate treatment claim, and
allowed the case to go to the jury. 127 The jury returned a
verdict in favor of Costa for over $350,000 in back pay,
compensatory damages, and punitive damages. 128
On appeal, a three-member panel of the Ninth Circuit
agreed with the casino that it was reversible error to give the
jury a mixed-motive instruction in the "absence of substantial
evidence of conduct or statements by the employer directly
reflecting discriminatory animus."129 Acknowledging that the
Ninth Circuit had not directly addressed the direct evidence
issue, it reviewed all the other federal circuits and argued that
each of them concluded "that evidence that merely raises an
inference of discrimination from differential treatment is not
sufficient to shift the burden to the defendant." 130 The court
121. Id. at 846.
122. Id.
123. Id. After Costa and the male colleague complained about their
disciplines, an independent arbitrator upheld both the suspension and the
termination based on each employee's disciplinary records. Costa v. Desert
Palace, Inc., 238 F.3d 1056, 1058 (9th Cir. 2000), reh'g granted, 274 F.3d 1306
(2001), reh'g en banc, 299 F.3d 838 (2002).
124. Costa, 299 F.3d at 846.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 268 F.3d 882, 884 (9th Cir. 2001), reh'g
granted, 274 F.3d 1306 (2001), reh'g en banc, 299 F.3d 838 (2002), cert.
granted, 123 S. Ct. 816 (2003).
130. Id. at 886.
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found that even if Costa's evidence 131 raised an inference of
discrimination, it was not sufficient to satisfy Price
Waterhouse's "motivating part" standard.132 Costa, it held, had
failed to produce "direct and substantial" evidence that she was
treated differently than her colleagues because of her sex. 133 In
so holding, the court relied on Justice O'Connor's Price
Waterhouse direct evidence requirement. 134
Sitting en banc, the Ninth Circuit reversed the panel's
decision, holding that the 1991 Civil Rights Act had overruled
Price Waterhouse, and thus had also overruled O'Connor's
direct evidence requirement. 35 In refusing to hold mixed-
motive plaintiffs to a direct evidence standard, the court
acknowledged that it departed from other circuits, and said
that the varying interpretations of the correct standard of proof
in mixed-motive cases have been a "quagmire that defies
characterization." 136 To resolve the issue, the court turned to a
straightforward look at the text of the statute, 137 radically
departing from most of the other federal circuits, which still
attempt to incorporate O'Connor's direct evidence requirement
into the new scheme of Title VII.138 The Ninth Circuit
suggested that "[tihe legislative history evinces a clear intent to
overrule Price Waterhouse," and that the 1991 amendments
clarified "(1) that a Title VII violation is established through
proof that a protected characteristic was 'a motivating factor' in
the employment action and (2) that the employer's 'same
decision' evidence serves as an affirmative defense with respect
to the scope of remedies, not as a defense to liability."139
Therefore, the court concluded that the premise for Justice
131. The panel suggested that of all of Costa's evidence, only two incidents
bore any connection to gender: the assignment of overtime hours and a
supervisor's calling Costa "a bitch." Id.
132. Id. at 889.
133. Id.
134. Id. The Costa panel used language similar to Justice O'Connor's
concurrence in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, where she required that the
plaintiff show "by direct evidence that an illegitimate criterion was a
substantial factor in the decision." 490 U.S. 228, 276 (1989)(emphasis added).
135. Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 850-51 (9th Cir. 2002) (en
banc), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 816 (2003).
136. Id. at 851.
137. Id. at 850-51.
138. See supra notes 85-111 and accompanying text (outlining the three
different approaches of direct evidence required by the federal circuits).
139. Costa, 299 F.3d at 850.
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O'Connor's "passing reference" 140 to direct evidence was "wholly
abrogated."' 41
Given that an employer's discriminatory conduct can no
longer "escape liability" through an employer's articulation of
the same decision defense, 42 the court reasoned that "there is
no longer a basis for any special 'evidentiary scheme' or
heightened standard of proof to determine 'but for'
causation." 143  The court stated its holding simply: "[T]he
plaintiff in any Title VII case may establish a violation through
a preponderance of evidence (whether direct or circumstantial)
that a protected characteristic played 'amotivating factor. 1" 44
Because a Title VII plaintiff need not have direct evidence in
order to proceed under a mixed-motive theory, the court held
that the district court did not err in giving a mixed-motive jury
instruction.145  It reasoned that the "wide array of
discriminatory treatment is sufficient to support a conclusion
that sex was also a motivating factor in the decision-making
process," and thus the instruction was proper. 146
In addition to holding that a mixed-motive plaintiff need
not use direct evidence, the court reframed the purpose of the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting scheme and discussed the
differences between pretext cases and mixed-motive cases. 47 It
reasoned that McDonnell Douglas offers a structure of proof
mainly as a tool for plaintiffs to survive a defendant's motion
for summary judgment in order to reach trial. 148 Thus, a
McDonnell Douglas inquiry happens at a fundamentally
different time in the litigation than does a mixed-motive
inquiry. 49
Additionally, the court seemed to merge pretext and mixed-
motive cases. 50  It said that selecting the proper jury
instruction simply rested on a "determination of whether the
evidence supports a finding that just one-or more than one-
140. Id. at 847.
141. Id. at 850.
142. Id. at 850-51 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(I), at 47 (1991), reprinted in
1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 585).
143. Id. at 851.
144. Id. at 853-54.
145. See id. at 858-59.
146. Id. at 859.
147. Id. at 854-57.
148. See id. at 855-56.
149. Id. at 857
150. See infra Part IV.A.
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factor actually motivated the challenged decision."1 51 The court
concluded that there are not "two fundamentally different types
of Title VII cases. In some cases, the employer may be entitled
to the 'same decision' affirmative defense instruction. In
others, it may not."152 Thus, the Ninth Circuit suggested that
the only difference between pretext cases and mixed-motive
cases is the number of motivations behind the challenged
employment action. It disagreed that pretext cases proceed
under a McDonnell Douglas framework, while mixed-motive
cases proceed under Price Waterhouse. Instead, McDonnell
Douglas comes into play at the summary judgement stage for
all plaintiffs, while Price Waterhouse plays a role only when the
trial court determines that more than one motivation was
behind the employment action. 153 Over a strong dissent,154 the
Ninth Circuit's opinion in Costa eliminated the direct evidence
requirement, 155 noted that McDonnell Douglas is most
important at summary judgment, 156 and significantly reduced
the distinction between pretext and mixed-motive actions. 57
III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S REFUSAL IN COSTA TO
REQUIRE DIRECT EVIDENCE FOR MIXED-MOTIVE
PLAINTIFFS IS DEFENSIBLE UNDER TITLE VII AND
PRICE WATERHOUSE
The Ninth Circuit's opinion in Costa puts it squarely in
conflict with the other federal circuits, which require a plaintiff
to produce some version of direct evidence in order to merit
receiving a mixed-motive jury instruction. 158 While it is facially
151. Costa, 299 F.3d at 856.
152. Id. at 857.
153. See id. at 854-58.
154. In dissent, Judge Gould argued that direct evidence should be
required because the mixed-motive theory is meant to be "available only in a
special subset of cases" in order to prevent the framework from overwhelming
all disparate treatment cases. Id. at 867 (Gould, J., dissenting). He concluded
that McDonnell Douglas would effectively be overruled by an interpretation of
Price Waterhouse that "jettisons the direct evidence requirement, an effect
that could not have been intended in Hopkins and an effect that will create
uncertainty in our settled law." Id.
155. Id. at 851-54.
156. Id. at 855-56.
157. Id. at 854-57.
158. See supra notes 85-111, 135-46 and accompanying text (discussing the
three standards of direct evidence required by federal circuits and the Ninth
Circuit's elimination of the direct evidence requirement in Costa).
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similar to the Fourth Circuit's animus approach, 159 the Ninth
Circuit is the first to hold that a plaintiff need not provide
direct evidence in order to receive a mixed-motive instruction.
As such, it represents a major departure from prevailing
common law, and is particularly distant from those circuits
holding plaintiffs to the strict classic definition of direct
evidence.160 Given the varying direct evidence approaches, it is
not surprising that the Supreme Court granted the casino's
petition for certiorari. 161
This Comment argues that the Court should affirm the
Ninth Circuit's refusal to require direct evidence, as this
approach is more consistent with both Title VII and the
underlying issue in Price Waterhouse: causation. To that end,
this Part discusses the failings of the direct evidence
jurisprudence of the other federal circuits, explains the
superiority of the Ninth Circuit's holding in Costa, and
concludes with a discussion of Costa's weaknesses.
A. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE EXISTING DIRECT EVIDENCE
JURISPRUDENCE
The federal circuits that impose a direct evidence
requirement on mixed-motive plaintiffs suffer from three basic
shortcomings. First, the decisions fail to explain why direct
evidence is required. 162 Second, they incorrectly impose the
higher requirement of direct evidence in order to balance what
they believe to be the the relative "ease" of proving a mixed-
motive case. 163  Finally, the existing direct evidence
jurisprudence undervalues the importance of the changes
effected by the 1991 amendments to the Civil Rights Act, and
thus places too much emphasis on Price Waterhouse.164
The federal circuits that require plaintiffs to prove
discrimination was a motivating factor in a challenged
employment action through the use of direct evidence often do
159. Courts applying an animus definition merely require a plaintiff to
prove that discrimination was a substantial factor in a challenged employment
action through the use of probative direct or indirect evidence. See supra
notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text (discussing the classic
definition of direct evidence).
161. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 123 S. Ct. 816 (2003).
162. See infra notes 165-73 and accompanying text.
163. See infra notes 175-84 and accompanying text.
164. See infra notes 185-87 and accompanying text.
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so without significant discussion of why direct evidence is
required. For example, in Mooney v. Aramco Services Co., the
Fifth Circuit merely commented that direct evidence is the
trigger in order for a plaintiff to proceed under a mixed-motive
theory, citing Price Waterhouse.165 The court did not delve
extensively into the language of either Title VII or Price
Waterhouse, which suggests that it did not significantly address
the issue of whether direct evidence is actually required. 166
Even when a court has attempted to discuss why direct
evidence is required, it fails. In Mooney, the court relied on
Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., a Third Circuit case noting that
the rationale behind requiring direct evidence is the probative
strength of such evidence. 167 Yet this does not indicate why
direct evidence should be required in order for a plaintiff to
proceed under a mixed-motive theory. It simply explains the
probative difference between direct evidence (under the classic
definition) and other sorts of evidence. That direct evidence is
more compelling or probative of discrimination does not in and
of itself suggest that it must be proffered in order to merit a
mixed-motive jury instruction. Yet rather than discuss why
direct evidence is required, the federal circuits tend to focus
their attention on what constitutes direct evidence, employing
the classic definition, the animus plus definition, or the animus
definition. 168
Further, the direct evidence requirement is not premised
on clear statutory language involving direct evidence. The plain
language of Title VII, standing alone, indicates that direct
evidence is not required to prove disparate treatment. 169 The
165. 54 F.3d 1207, 1216-17 (5th Cir. 1995).
166. Id.
167. See id. at 1216 n.10. InArmbruster, the Third Circuit wrote that
in the Price Waterhouse framework ... the evidence the plaintiff
produces is so revealing of discriminatory animus that it is not
necessary to rely on any presumption from the prima facie case to
shift the burden of production. Both the burden of production and the
risk of nonpersuasion are shifted to the defendant who, because of the
inference the overt evidence showing the employee's bias permits,
must persuade the factfinder that even if discrimination was a
motivating factor in the adverse employment decision, it would have
made the same employment decision regardless of its discriminatory
animus.
Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 778 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244-46 (1989)); Griffiths v. Cigna Corp.,
988 F.2d 457, 469-70, 470 n.12 (3d Cir. 1993).
168. See supra notes 85-111 and accompanying text.
169. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, -1, -17 (2000); see supra notes 17, 65-71 and
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addition of subsection (m) to section 703 of Title VII makes it
clear that an unlawful employment practice is established
when a protected characteristic such as race or sex is a
"motivating factor" in an employment action. 170 The statute
makes no reference to the quantum of evidence required to
prove that a motivating factor was the cause of a challenged
employment action. Dissenting in Costa, Judge Gould argued
that this statutory silence on the direct evidence requirement
indicated that "Congress left undisturbed Justice O'Connor's
holding and the prior circuit decisions that adhered to it."171
The 1991 amendments to Title VII, however, so fundamentally
altered the causation structure of the statute that one cannot
merely interpret silence as acquiescence. 172  The relevant
legislative history is similarly unhelpful, as Congress neither
explicitly affirmed nor rejected the requirement. 173 Because it
is not appropriate to interpret silence as an affirmation of the
direct evidence requirement, neither the text of Title VII nor
the legislative history surrounding the 1991 amendments
suggest that direct evidence is required. 174
accompanying text (discussing the major substantive sections of Title VII and
the 1991 amendments).
170. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
171. Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 866 (9th Cir. 2002) (Gould,
J., dissenting), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 816 (2003).
172. See infra notes 189-207 and accompanying text (outlining the
causation structure of Title VII and the changes implemented by the 1991
amendments).
173. See supra notes 73-84 and accompanying text (describing the relative
lack of attention paid by Congress to the direct evidence requirement when
amending Title VII); see also Costa, 299 F.3d at 850 (citing Watson v.
Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 207 F.3d 207, 218-19 (3d Cir. 2000)). Yet
neither courts nor commentators seem to take note of the use of the term
.nexus" in the Conference Report dealing with Congress's partial rejection of
Price Waterhouse. In that report, the Committee determined that evidence
was sufficient to merit proceeding under a motivating factor test only if "the
plaintiff shows a nexus between the conduct or statements and the
employment decision at issue." H.R. REP. No. 102-40 (II), at 18 (1991),
reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 695, 711. The Committee's discussion suggests
that it did not intend to require direct evidence of mixed-motive plaintiffs
because direct evidence under a classical definition proves the fact of
discriminatory animus in the employment decision without need for an
inference or "nexus." See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text. Since the
Committee apparently thought that statements requiring a nexus in order to
be connected to the employment decision at issue would be relevant under the
motivating factor test, it follows that non-direct evidence would be sufficient to
trigger mixed-motive analysis because such evidence requires a nexus to the
challenged employment action.
174. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
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Circuits requiring direct evidence may believe it is not
necessary to discuss why it is required given the assumption
that a mixed-motive case is easier for a plaintiff to prove than a
pretext case. 175 A mixed-motive case sometimes has been
considered slightly easier to prove than a pretext case because
the plaintiff only needs to establish that her membership in a
protected class was a motivating factor behind the employment
action; in a pretext case, a plaintiff must prove that the
employer was solely motivated by discrimination. 176 The
assumption that a mixed-motive action is easier to prove has
prompted the idea that a plaintiff must meet a higher
evidentiary standard-the direct evidence requirement-in
order to benefit from the "easier" proof scheme. 177 As some
jurists have commented, including the dissent in Costa,
removing the direct evidence requirement would allow
plaintiffs who could not meet the higher standards of a pretext
case to pursue their action unfairly under a mixed-motive
theory. 178
This assumption that a higher evidentiary standard is
required to balance the relative ease of proving a mixed-motive
case is flawed for two reasons. First, the essential question in
any disparate treatment case is whether the plaintiff has met
her burden of proving that she was discriminated against,
regardless of whether she has pursued a mixed-motive or a
pretext action. 179 The Ninth Circuit confirmed this when Judge
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 1020-21 (3d ed.
2001).
175. This idea is foreshadowed by Justice O'Connor's concurrence, where
she wrote that direct evidence is required to justify "the strong medicine of
requiring the employer to bear the burden of persuasion on the issue of
causation." Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 262 (1989) (O'Connor,
J., concurring).
176. See supra notes 21-40, 49-55, 65-71 and accompanying text
(explaining the pretext theory of intentional discrimination, the Price
Waterhouse "motivating factor" standard for mixed-motive cases, and the
adoption of this test in the 1991 amendments to Title VII).
177. See Ward, supra note 41, at 658 (arguing that the Price Waterhouse
mixed-motive framework was "meant to serve as a type of merit system
'rewarding' plaintiffs who provided the best evidence of discrimination").
178. In dissent, Judge Gould wrote that the direct evidence requirement
mandates that the plaintiff "produce highly probative, direct evidence, before
she may utilize the more lenient, mixed motives test." Costa, 299 F.3d at 867
(Gould, J., dissenting).
179. E.g., Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)
(noting that the plaintiff maintains the "ultimate burden of persuading the
trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the
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McKeown noted the "canons of proof' in employment
discrimination cases: "[T]he plaintiff retains the 'ultimate
burden of persuading the court that she has been the victim of
intentional discrimination'; the question comes down to
whether she has made her case."180
Second, the remedies available to mixed-motive plaintiffs
are much more limited than those available to plaintiffs
offering a pretext case, which may mitigate against the judicial
reluctance to allow plaintiffs to proceed under a mixed-motive
theory. 181 A plaintiff who is able to prove that her membership
in a protected class was a "motivating factor" in a challenged
employment action will only be entitled to equitable relief if the
defendant-employer is able to prove that it would have made
the same decision absent discrimination.182 Equitable remedies
include declaratory judgments, injunctive relief, and attorney's
fees, but exclude back pay, front pay, or reinstatement. 183
Thus, a plaintiff who chooses to proceed along a mixed-motive
path bears the very real risk that the litigation will not help
her financially. If she is entitled only to equitable relief, she
will not be put in the position she would have been in absent
discrimination (that is, she will not be in the same potential
financial or employment position). A plaintiff entitled to
monetary relief, reinstatement, promotion, or other similar
remedy (where the defendant is not able to prove it would have
made the same decision absent discrimination) is arguably in
the same position she would have been in absent
discrimination.184 Because a limited remedy is available under
the purportedly easier mixed-motive proof standard, there is no
reason to require a heightened evidentiary standard in order to
achieve parity.
plaintiff'); accord Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133,
143 (2000).
180. Costa, 299 F.3d at 855 (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256; St. Mary's
Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993)).
181. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i)-(ii) (2000) (outlining the available
remedies in a mixed-motive case where the defendant successfully proves a
same decision defense).
182. See id.
183. Id.
184. The Supreme Court has noted that one of the most significant
purposes of Title VII is to "make persons whole for injuries suffered on account
of unlawful employment discrimination." Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405, 418 (1975). This purpose aims to put the injured person in the
position she would have been in if the wrong had not been committed. Id. at
418-19 (citing Wicker v. Hoppock, 73 U.S. 94, 99 (1867)).
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Given that the statute does not refer to the required
evidence, and that the legislative history does not clarify the
answer, courts that impose a direct evidence requirement on
mixed-motive plaintiffs must do so entirely on the basis of Price
Waterhouse.18 5  Judicial reliance on Price Waterhouse is
necessary considering both the lack of circuit court attention
paid to the reasoning behind the direct evidence requirement
and the absence of clear statutory guidance. Most courts,
however, do not analyze O'Connor's Price Waterhouse
concurrence, except to state that it requires plaintiffs to present
direct evidence in order to receive a mixed-motive jury
instruction.18 6  This reasoning fails to account for the
fundamental change made by the 1991 amendments to Title
VII, namely that the amendments altered the causation
structure from a but-for system to a lesser, undefined
system. 187 Because the existing direct evidence jurisprudence
undervalues the importance of this change, it places too much
emphasis on Price Waterhouse.
In sum, the three basic shortcomings of existing direct
evidence jurisprudence are a failure to explain why direct
evidence is required, an incorrect imposition of a higher
evidentiary standard because of an assumption about the ease
of proving a mixed-motive case, and a failure to value the
changes effected by the 1991 amendments to the Civil Rights
Act.
B. THE SUPERIORITY OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S APPROACH
Costa's rejection of the direct evidence requirement runs
directly contrary to the other circuits, which adhere to the idea
that the direct evidence requirement is meant as a reward for
plaintiffs who have direct evidence of discrimination. 188
Instead, the Ninth Circuit's holding was premised on the
conclusion that Justice O'Connor's articulation of the
requirement was based on Title VII's but-for causation
185. See, e.g., Costa, 299 F.3d at 866 (Gould, J., dissenting). Judge Gould
argued that Congress's failure to respond directly to Justice O'Connor's direct
evidence requirement left both itand the prior decisions that adhered to the
direct evidence requirement, undisturbed. Id. He wrote that "[a] s we remain
bound by the Supreme Court's precedent, we must follow the direct evidence
rule as explained in Justice O'Connor's concurrence." Id.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 165-66.
187. See Costa, 299 F.3d at 851-54; see infra notes 189-207 and
accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 175-78 and accompanying text.
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system.189 The court in Costa maintained that prior to Price
Waterhouse and the 1991 amendments to Title VII, a plaintiffs
successful Title VII claim must have been based on proof that
but for the illegal consideration of the plaintiffs membership in
a protected class, the challenged employment action would not
have occurred. 190 The Ninth Circuit's premised its holding on
the idea that the causation structure of Title VII was
fundamentally altered by the 1991 amendments.' 91
Through Price Waterhouse, it was settled that but-for
causation was required in a plaintiffs disparate treatment
case. 192 Each of the three main opinions-Justice Brennan's
plurality opinion, Justice O'Connor's concurrence, and Justice
Kennedy's dissent-embraced but-for causation in their own
way. Justice Brennan initially seemed to dismiss but-for
causation, saying that Title VII's "because of' language was not
synonymous with but-for causation. 193  Nonetheless, he
incorporated but-for causation into a mixed-motive case by
suggesting that the defendant may escape liability by proving it
would have made the same decision absent discrimination. 194
189. Costa, 299 F.3d at 847, 850-54. But-for causation is generally used to
determine if one factor caused an event. See Susan Bisom-Rapp, Of Motives
and Maleness: A Critical View of Mixed Motive Doctrine in Title VII Sex
Discrimination Cases, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 1029, 1035 (citing W. PAGE KEETON
ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 265-66 (5th ed.
1984)). It requires a fact finder to ask if an event would have happened even
without the factor in question. Id. If the answer is "no," the factor is
considered a "but-for" cause. Id.
190. Costa, 299 F.3d at 851.
191. Id. at 850-51.
192. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244-45 (1989). But cf.
Paul J. Gudel, Beyond Causation: The Interpretation of Action and the Mixed
Motives Problem in Employment Discrimination Law, 70 TEX. L. REV. 17, 52
(1991) (suggesting that courts have found the "but-for" causation model to be
an "unsatisfactory formulation" of the plaintiffs burden of proof, and that the
practical result is that courts have "been left free to fall back on a purely
intuitive sense of what evidence establishes a sufficient causal nexus between
motive and act" in order to shift the burden to the defendant).
193. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240-42 (plurality opinion). Justice
Brennan observed that "[t]o construe the words 'because of as colloquial
shorthand for 'but-for causation,' as does Price Waterhouse, is to
misunderstand them." Id. at 240. Gudel suggests that the Court's rejection of
but-for causation seems based on the idea that Congress "could not have
'meant to obligate a plaintiff to identify the precise causal role played by
legitimate and illegitimate motivations in the employment decisions she
challenges'... [because] the difficulty in making that proof would defeat the
goals of Title VII's as a remedial statute." Gudel, supra note 192, at 60.
194. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244-47 (plurality opinion).
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In essence, Justice Brennan simply moved the burden of proof
from the plaintiff to the defendant by forcing the defendant to
prove the absence of but-for causation as an affirmative
defense. 195  As one commentator has noted, "[tlhe Court
changed the party who bears the burden of proving 'but for'
causation, but that concept still defines the only situation in
which Title VII liability attaches." 96
Similarly, Justice O'Connor adhered to but-for causation as
the standard for Title VII cases. 197 She disagreed with the
plurality's assertion that the language of Title VII was distinct
from but-for causation. 198 She stated that Title VII's legislative
history and plain language both suggest a "substantive
violation of the statute only occurs when consideration of an
illegitimate criterion is the 'but-for' cause of an adverse
employment action."' 99
Finally, Justice Kennedy suggested that Title VII's
familiar "because of" language was intimately connected to but-
for causation. 200 Although he acknowledged that courts did not
always use the precise words "but-for," he argued that each of
the causation constructions were synonymous with but-for
causation. 20 1 At base, he argued, Title VII was directed at
employment decisions that result from impermissible,
discriminatory motives. 20 2 Thus, each of the main opinions in
Price Waterhouse indicate in one way or another that but-for
causation is an element of a disparate treatment action.
The 1991 amendments to Title VII are a radical departure
from but-for causation, as indicated by the Ninth Circuit.20 3
Since the amendments indicated that a plaintiff merely show
that one's membership in a protected class was a "motivating
195. Id. at 246.
196. Gudel, supra note 192, at 61. In dissent, Justice Kennedy made this
same point. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 281 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). He
wrote that the plurality opinion had merely shifted the burden of proving the
lack of but-for causation to the defendant, and concluded that "it is clear that,
whoever bears the burden of proof on the issue, Title VII liability requires a
finding of but-for causation." Id.
197. Price Waterhouse at 262-63 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
198. Id. at 240-42 (plurality opinion).
199. Id. at 262 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
200. See id. at 281-82 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
201. Id. ("The verbal forumlae we have used in our precedents are
synonymous with but-for causation.").
202. Id.
203. Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 850-51 (9th Cir. 2002) (en
banc), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 816 (2003)..
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factor" behind the employment decision, a plaintiff need not
prove that discrimination on the basis of this membership was
the but-for cause of the decision.20 4 Moreover, the application
of but-for causation in tort law suggests that it is not always
appropriate in cases where two or more occurrences bring
about a single event.20 5 Thus, both the 1991 amendments to
Title VII and general principles of tort law, from which Title
VII's construction of causation stems, suggest that but-for
causation is not required in mixed-motive cases.20 6 Instead,
Title VII embraces a lesser causation standard: An employer is
liable for a challenged employment action if discrimination
based on the plaintiffs membership in a protected class
contributed to the action in any way.
As a result, the Costa court properly reasons that the 1991
amendments obviate Justice O'Connor's premise for the direct
evidence requirement. Justice O'Connor preferred a direct
evidence requirement for disparate treatment plaintiffs based
on the notion that a higher evidentiary standard should be
applied when a plaintiff cannot prove but-for causation, which
she believed was required under Title VII. 20 7 Because but-for
causation no longer needs to be proved in connection with a
Title VII allegation, plaintiffs should not be required to produce
direct evidence of discrimination to proceed under a mixed-
motive theory.
204. Many commentators echo this point. See Rebecca Hanner White &
Linda Hamilton Krieger, Whose Motive Matters?: Discrimination in Multi-
Actor Employment Decision Making, 61 LA. L. REV. 495, 505 (2001); Zimmer,
supra note 67, at 600-09; Tristin K. Green, Comment, Making Sense of the
McDonnell Douglas Framework: Circumstantial Evidence and Proof of
Disparate Treatment Under Title VII, 87 CAL. L. REV. 983, 1007 (1999).
205. See KEETON, supra note 189, § 41 at 266. In a classic example, if two
men independently shoot and kill a third (the bullets of both men hitting the
third man), neither shot is a but-for cause of the man's death. Id. Both
shooters could not be held liable under a system of but-for causation. See id.;
see also Stuart Bass & Nathan S. Slavin, Avoiding Sexual Discrimination
Litigation in Accounting Firms and Other Professional Organizations: The
Impact of the Supreme Court Decision in Price Waterhouse v. Ann B. Hopkins,
13 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 21, 27 (1991) (discussing the application of but-for
causation in mixed-motive cases).
206. See supra notes 189-91, 203-05 and accompanying text.
207. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 262-79 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
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C. THE WEAKNESSES OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION IN
COSTA
Despite the fact that Costa's interpretation of direct
evidence is more consistent with Title VII and Price Waterhouse
than the other federal circuits, the decision has some
weaknesses. Although it is superior to the other federal
circuits in explaining why it chose not to impose a direct
evidence requirement, 2 8 Costa suffers from a lack of detailed
attention to the discussion of causation in Price Waterhouse
and Title VII in general. The Ninth Circuit blithely observed
that Justice O'Connor's direct evidence requirement was
merely a "passing reference."20 9 The court devotes barely two
paragraphs out of a twenty-one page opinion to explain the
causation issues in Price Waterhouse.210 Because its move from
direct evidence puts it in sharp conflict with the other federal
circuits, the court should have fully explained the underlying
causation issue in Price Waterhouse and how the causation
structure was altered by the 1991 amendments.
The court also failed to address two basic statutory
interpretation arguments that, taken together, may indicate
that the amendments did not alter the underlying causation
structure of Title VII. One argument is that if the lower courts
misinterpreted Title VII and Price Waterhouse to include a
direct evidence requirement, the Court and Congress would
have changed an obviously wrong interpretation of a statute.
That neither has acted to clarify the issues of causation and the
direct evidence requirement might suggest that the lower
courts interpret the two correctly. 211 This argument has less
force, however, given that Congress has not taken an
opportunity to amend Title VII since 1991, when circuits began
to hold plaintiffs to a direct evidence requirement. If it had
taken such an opportunity and refused to address the direct
evidence requirement, this silence would be more easily
interpreted as congressional acquiescence. In addition, the
argument that silence suggests the lower courts' direct
evidence requirement is correct is generally stronger if there is
208. See supra notes 165-68 and accompanying text (discussing Costa's
reasoning and the relative lack of explanation of the other federal circuits).
209. Costa, 299 F.3d at 851.
210. See id.
211. This concept is known as the "acquiescence rule." See ESKRIDGE ET
AL., supra note 174, at 1020-21.
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evidence that Congress was aware of the interpretation. 212 No
such evidence exists. 213 As a result, the argument does not
defeat the Ninth Circuit's choice to eliminate the direct
evidence requirement. Nonetheless, the court should have
addressed it.
A second canon of statutory interpretation posits that
when Congress means to make such a dramatic change in the
law, it says so explicitly.214 Thus, if the 1991 amendments did
fundamentally change causation under Title VII, Congress is
expected to realize the import of the change and note it in some
way, either explicitly in the statute or somewhere in the
legislative history. This argument fails to recognize, however,
that Congress often does not signal that it is making an
important change in the law, partially because Congress is not
always aware of the import that changes in the law can have.215
In addition, arguments involving legislative inaction have been
strongly criticized both by commentators and jurists, who argue
that since it is difficult enough to infer evidence of intent from
legislative action, it is even more difficult to take inaction as
such evidence. 216 In any event, it is curious that the court in
Costa failed to discuss either of these issues because of its
significant departure from the direct evidence requirement.
212. See id. at 1021.
213. See supra notes 75-84 and accompanying text (noting the portions of
the legislative history behind the 1991 amendments relevant to the direct
evidence problem).
214. This concept is sometimes called the "dog that did not bark" canon.
See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 174, at 1020. The canon refers to the
expectation that legislative "watchdogs" will "bark" at a significant statutory
change. Id. Examples of this reasoning can be found in Justice Stevens's
majority opinions in Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991), and Green v. Bock
Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504 (1989).
215. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L.
REV. 621, 640-56 (1990) (detailing criticisms of the traditional canons of
statutory interpretation).
216. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 174, at 1034 (citing HENRY
HART, JR. & ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1313-70 (William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994)); John Grabow, Congressional
Silence and the Search for Legislative Intent: A Venture into "Speculative
Unrealities", 64 B.U. L. REv. 737, 746-50 (1984)); see also Eskridge, supra note
215, at 634-35, 640. Eskridge notes that legislative silence "is usually too
ambiguous to count as legislative history." Id. at 640.
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IV. COSTA'S IMPACT ON THE DIRECT EVIDENCE
REQUIREMENT AND THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
FOR EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES
In addition to being significantly different from the other
circuits, the Ninth Circuit's elimination of the direct evidence
requirement in Costa is notable because it has three major
effects for disparate treatment cases. First, it merges pretext
and mixed-motive cases.217  Second, it de-emphasizes the
McDonnell Douglas standard.218 Finally, it signals a move
towards the decreasing force of presumptions in employment
discrimination law, especially when considered in conjunction
with other recent Supreme Court decisions. 219
A. ELIMINATING THE DIRECT EVIDENCE REQUIREMENT RESULTS
IN A MERGER OF PRETEXT AND MIXED-MOTIVE CASES
Without the direct evidence requirement, there seems to be
little practical difference between pretext and mixed-motive
cases.220  As the Costa court noted, the main distinction
between pretext cases and mixed-motive cases is the number of
motivations allegedly behind a challenged employment
action. 221  Thus the distinction is factual, not legal. This
merger is a necessary by-product of not requiring direct
evidence. Circuits requiring direct evidence segment disparate
treatment cases into the pretext and mixed-motive classes on
the basis of direct evidence. 222 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit's
217. See infra notes 220-32 and accompanying text.
218. See infra notes 233-45 and accompanying text.
219. See infra notes 246-56 and accompanying text; see also Swierkiewicz v.
Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510-12 (2002) (holding that a complaint in an
employment discrimination suit need not plead facts establishing a prima
facie case of discrimination).
220. See Zimmer, supra note 67, at 600-09; Green, supra note 204, at 1004-
07; Mizer, supra note 65, at 260-62. Tristin K. Green argues that McDonnell
Douglas applies whenever the plaintiff has only circumstantial evidence of
discrimination (and not direct evidence), but "encompasses both the falsity-of-
proffered-reason method [pretext cases] and the motivating-factor method of
proof [mixed-motive cases]." Green, supra note 204, at 1004. Mizer, on the
other hand, argues that the plain language of Title VII has eliminated the
distinction between pretext and mixed-motive cases because the structure of
the Act suggests that a "motivating factor test controls all discrimination
claims." Mizer, supra note 65, at 253.
221. Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 855-58 (9th Cir. 2002) (en
banc), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 816 (2003).
222. See supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text (discussing the impact
of requiring direct evidence on putative mixed-motive plaintiffs and the three
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holding suggests that even if a plaintiff could produce direct
evidence of discrimination, her case would proceed regardless of
whether she did not have such evidence. 223 Indeed, the only
element that changes the analysis is the actual number of
motivations behind the challenged employment action.224
Given the elimination of the direct evidence requirement as a
prerequisite for the "motivating factor" test, Costa suggests
that cases involving a single motivating factor should be
analyzed under section 703(a)'s "because of' standard, while
mixed-motive cases (both those meeting the old direct evidence
requirement and those unable to meet the requirement) should
be governed by the section 703(m) "motivating factor" test.225
In this fashion, eliminating the direct evidence requirement
merges the pretext and mixed-motive theories.
Yet merging the pretext and mixed-motive theories of
intentional discrimination seems directly contrary to one of
Title VII's major organizing principles: the separation of section
703(a) and section 703(m). As discussed above, section 703(a)
makes an employment action taken "because of' someone's
membership in a protected class unlawful,226 while section
703(m) sets out the "motivating factor" test.227 Some might
argue that if Congress had intended to subject both sets of
claims to the motivating factor test, it would have said so in
some fashion or another, given that the "because of' test has
been the fundamental language since the inception of Title VII
in 1964.228
Despite the separation of section 703(a) and section
standards of direct evidence required by the federal circuits).
223. Costa, 299 F.3d at 853-58.
224. See id. at 856-58.
225. See id. at 856-57. In Costa, the Ninth Circuit suggested that a case
should proceed under the "because of' standard if "the only reasonable
conclusion a jury could reach is that discriminatory animus is the sole cause
for the challenged employment action or that discrimination played no role at
all in the employer's decisionmaking." Id. at 856. The "motivating factor" test
should be used, it argued, when the facts support "a finding that
discrimination is one of two or more reasons for the challenged decision." Id.
226. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
227. Id. § 2000e-2(m).
228. This, in essence, is Judge Stahl's interpretation in Carey v. Mt. Desert
Island Hosp., 156 F.3d 31, 42-48 (1998) (Stahl, J., dissenting). Judge Stahl
suggested that Congress's enactment of the motivating factor test should not
be interpreted as eradicating "the established legal landscape governing the
litigation of disparate treatment cases," and thus proposed that the test should
not apply to all pretext cases. Id. at 45-46.
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703(m), Costa's merging of pretext and mixed-motive cases is
appropriate. The plain language of Title VII indicates that an
unlawful employment practice is established when an
employment decision is made "because of' one's membership in
a protected group,229 or when that membership is simply a
"motivating factor."230 When taken with the elimination of the
direct evidence requirement, this language suggests that the
number of motivations behind a challenged employment action
should determine which of the two sections-703(a) or 703(m)-
applies. 231 Even if this results in a merging of the pretext and
mixed-motive cases, the "because of' discrimination test (under
section 703(a)) and "motivating factor" discrimination test
(under section 703(m)) are not collapsed. That the two tests of
discrimination are not collapsed cuts strongly against the
argument that pretext and mixed-motive cases should not be
merged because 703(a) or 703(m) are separated. Therefore,
mixed-motive and pretext cases are not fundamentally different
causes of action.232
B. ELIMINATING THE DIRECT EVIDENCE REQUIREMENT RESULTS
IN A DE-EMPHASIS OF MCDONNELL DOUGLAS
Removing the direct evidence requirement, and thus
conflating pretext and mixed-motive cases, affects the
McDonnell Douglas framework. As suggested by the Ninth
Circuit, McDonnell Douglas is most important at summary
judgment because it articulates the general standard a plaintiff
must meet in order to survive a defendant's summary judgment
motion.233 The essence of McDonnell Douglas is that the
plaintiff must prove that an employer's legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for a challenged employment action
229. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a).
230. Id. § 2000e-2(m).
231. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
232. Other commentators have suggested the distinction between pretext
cases and mixed-motive cases should be eliminated. See Mizer, supra note 65,
at 253. Mizer argues that the 1991 Act created one controlling test for all
discrimination claims-the "motivating factor" test. Id. Based upon this
"uniform approach to disparate treatment claims," Mizer proposes a single set
of jury instructions that would apply in both the pretext and mixed-motive
cases. Id. at 253, 263.
233. Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 854-57 (9th Cir. 2002) (en
banc), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 816 (2003); see supra notes 148, 153 and
accompanying text.
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is pretext for discrimination. 234 In such a situation, there is
more than one reason asserted for the employment action:
discrimination, which is alleged by the plaintiff, and a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, alleged by the
defendant. 235 Once the determining factor between the use of
McDonnell Douglas framework and the Price Waterhouse
framework is no longer direct evidence, but the presence of a
single- or multiple-factor motive, McDonnell Douglas is no
longer relevant. Given the presence of more than one
motivation, courts should apply section 703(m)'s "motivating
factor" test. 236 The limited "because of' standard should apply
only in two circumstances: where discrimination on the basis of
the plaintiffs membership in a protected class is the sole
reason for the challenged employment action, or where
discrimination did not play any role in the decision.237
Costa thus greatly diminishes the impact of McDonnell
Douglas. While some have feared this result,238 it is
understandable given the current state of employment
discrimination. Unlike earlier discrimination that was more
overt, modern discrimination is often premised on a number of
234. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-07 (1973); see
supra notes 24-40 and accompanying text.
235. Professor Linda Hamilton Krieger properly notes that "[blecause no
one [employee] is perfect, few employers will be unable to articulate some
plausible reason for firing or failing to hire or promote any particular
employee or applicant." Krieger, supra note 20, at 1178. The frequency of
employer assertions of legitimate reasons behind employment actions strongly
suggests that most cases falling into the McDonnell Douglas framework will
be cases involving multiple motives.
236. See supra notes 221-32 and accompanying text.
237. See Costa, 299 F.3d at 856; supra note 225 and accompanying text.
Discrimination on the basis of the plaintiffs membership in a protected class
can be the sole reason for the employment action if the defendant-employer
asserts a legitimate reason for the action that the plaintiff can prove is mere
pretext for discrimination. Thus, even though the defendant has offered
another reason for the employment action (seemingly forcing the "motivating
factor" test), if the plaintiff can prove pretext, there is only one reason for the
employment action (and the "because of' test applies). Nonetheless, given the
practical difficulty of proving pretext, the McDonnell Douglas standard will be
used far less frequently when plaintiffs are not required to proffer direct
evidence in order to take advantage of the mixed-motive framework. Cf.
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142-49 (2000);
Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
238. Costa, 299 F.3d at 867 (Gould, J., dissenting). Gould argued both that
McDonnell Douglas would effectively be overruled by an interpretation of
Price Waterhouse that eliminated the direct evidence requirement, and that
such a result could not have been intended. Id.
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interrelated factors that are often products of unconscious
bias.239 Because modern discrimination is less likely to be
based on a sole factor, and because the McDonnell Douglas
framework does not apply to cases involving only one reason
behind the challenged employment action, McDonnell Douglas
is simply not as relevant in the modern context. It was the first
of the Court's forays into the problem of employment
discrimination, and served its purpose of defining what general
standard a plaintiff must meet in order to successfully
maintain a Title VII action.240 Although the American judicial
system is premised on following precedent, legal theories also
must fit an ever-changing picture of discrimination. 241
In addition, the refusal to apply direct evidence and the
resulting merger of the pretext and mixed-motive theories is
more compatible with the plaintiff-friendly scheme of Title VII.
While some worry that a step away from direct evidence
overburdens defendants, 242 the addition of section 706(g)(2)(B)
addresses this concern by limiting a defendant's liability to
equitable relief if it proves that it would have taken the same
employment action absent discrimination. 243  The "same
decision" defense is therefore another way Title VII balances
the interests of the employer and the employee. 244 This also
239. For a full articulation of this idea, see Krieger, supra note 20, at 1164
(summarizing her argument that current Title VII jurisprudence is
inadequate to address the "subtle, often unconscious forms of bias" that Title
VII was intended to address); and Christopher Y. Chen, Note, Rethinking the
Direct Evidence Requirement: A Suggested Approach in Analyzing Mixed-
Motives Discrimination Claims, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 899, 913-15 (2001).
240. See supra notes 21-29 and accompanying text (discussing McDonnell
Douglas and its articulation of the elements of a plaintiffs prima facie case of
discrimination).
241. See, e.g., BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 1-3 (1924);
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1-2 (4th ed. 1943). In
discussing the needs of modern law, then-Judge Cardozo wrote of "the need of
a philosophy that will mediate between the conflicting claims of stability and
progress, and supply a principle of growth." CARDOZO, supra, at 1.
242. See Ward, supra note 41, at 658-60. Joseph J. Ward argues that doing
away with the direct evidence requirement would provoke plaintiffs to file
"excessive or frivolous claims," which will increase the defendant's cost of
doing business since "jurors typically side with the employee in such cases,
rather than the 'Goliath' employer." Id. at 659.
243. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(ii) (2000); see supra notes 66-71 and
accompanying text (outlining the 1991 amendments to Title VII relevant to
mixed-motive cases).
244. Cf McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358-61
(1995). In McKennon, the Court sought to "recognize the duality between the
legitimate interests of the employer [limiting damages for a plaintiff-employee
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will discourage the filing of "excessive or frivolous" claims
because employees who face employers with strong proof that
they would have made the same decision absent discrimination
will only be able to receive equitable relief, declaratory relief,
injunctive relief, or the award of attorney's fees. 245  This
inability to receive monetary compensation also suggests that
an employee will be less likely to file an employment
discrimination claim against an employer able to assert the
same decision defense.
C. THE BROADER IMPLICATIONS OF ELIMINATING THE DIRECT
EVIDENCE REQUIREMENT
Finally, eliminating the direct evidence requirement may
signal a move towards decreasing the force of presumptions in
employment discrimination law. In refusing to require direct
evidence, the Ninth Circuit diminished the importance of
McDonnell Douglas,246 and thereby reduced the utility of the
most significant burden-shifting and presumption-creating
approach in employment discrimination law.247 Instead, the
Costa approach allows greater access to the mixed-motive
theory because of the elimination of the direct evidence
requirement. Thus the focus is on whether, given the totality of
the evidence, the plaintiff has proven she suffered
discrimination. 248 This approach is seen in the language of the
opinion itself, in Judge McKeown's point that the plaintiff must
ultimately prove that she was intentionally discriminated
against.249 Instead of relying on elaborate burden-shifting
schemes and presumptions, the Ninth Circuit achieved
given wrongdoing on the employee's part] and the important claims of the
employee who invokes the national employment policy mandated by the Act."
Id. at 361.
245. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(ii); see supra notes 66-71, 182-83 and
accompanying text (discussing the remedial limitations imposed by the 1991
amendments in cases where an employer successfully asserts the "same
decision" defense).
246. See supra notes 233-41 and accompanying text.
247. As discussed above, the burden-approach of McDonnell Douglas and
Burdine has been the traditional framework for employment discrimination
cases. See supra notes 21-40 and accompanying text (discussing intentional
pretextual discrimination).
248. Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 855 (9th Cir. 2002) (en
banc) (quoting Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256
(1981)), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 816 (2003).
249. Id.
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simplicity by looking at the plain text of the statute.250
This same simplicity is seen in recent Supreme Court cases
involving employment discrimination. For example, in
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A. ,251 the Court held that a complaint
in an employment discrimination lawsuit need not plead
specific facts establishing a prima facie case of
discrimination. 252 There, the Second Circuit had required the
plaintiffs pleading to specify facts going to a prima facie case of
discrimination in order to survive the defendant's motion to
dismiss.253 In reversing, the Supreme Court reasoned that the
requirements for establishing a prima facie case do not
correlate with the pleading standard a plaintiff must meet in
order to survive a motion to dismiss. 254 It concluded that
"[g]iven that the prima facie case operates as a flexible
evidentiary standard, it should not be transposed into a rigid
pleading standard for discrimination cases." 255 The Court's
refusal to approve judicially heightened pleading standards
suggests it views employment discrimination cases in a flexible
light. When considered with Costa, this may suggest that
employment discrimination jurisprudence is moving towards a
simpler standard: The plaintiff must prove she was the victim
of discrimination. Instead of needing to meet any specific
minimum standard beyond regular pleading rules, a plaintiff
must simply prove by the preponderance of the evidence that
her employer discriminated against her. In the words of Judge
McKeown, the ultimate question "comes down to whether she
has made her case."256
250. Id. at 851.
251. 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
252. Id. at 510-12.
253. Id. at 510. Thus, the Court of Appeals believed that the plaintiff was
required to allege (1) his membership in a protected class; (2) his qualification
for the job; (3) that he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) other
"circumstances that support an inference of discrimination." Id.
254. Id. at 511. The Court held that the prima facie case is not
commensurate with these pleading standards for two reasons. First,
McDonnell Douglas does not apply in every employment discrimination case.
Id. For example, it does not apply when a plaintiff can prove overt evidence of
discrimination. Id. Second, because the "precise requirements of a prima
facie case can vary depending on the context and were 'never intended to be
rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic."' Id. at 512 (citing Furnco Constr. Corp. v.
Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)).
255. Id.
256. Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 844 (9th Cir. 2002) (en
banc), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 816 (2003) (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson
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CONCLUSION
In Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., the Ninth Circuit held that
direct evidence is not required for a plaintiff to proceed under a
mixed-motive theory; instead, a plaintiff could succeed through
the use of either direct or circumstantial evidence. Differing
significantly from the other federal circuits' decisions, Costa
reached the correct conclusion, given that the 1991
amendments to Title VII changed the statute's underlying
method of but-for causation to a lesser, undefined method. The
Ninth Circuit's refusal to require direct evidence has far-
reaching ramifications for disparate treatment cases, as the
refusal merges pretext and mixed-motive cases, and drastically
reduces the importance of McDonnell Douglas. Yet because of
the significance of its eliminating the direct evidence
requirement, the Ninth Circuit erred in failing to explain its
holding fully. Despite Costa's weaknesses, the Supreme Court
should affirm the Ninth Circuit's refusal to require direct
evidence of mixed-motive plaintiffs, as this is the correct
interpretation of both Title VII and Price Waterhouse.
Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 142-49 (2000)); see also St. Mary's Honor Ctr.
v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993).
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